It-timbru tal-President

Waqt li inti qiegħed taqra dan l-artiklu, l-Eċċellenza Tiegħu il-President  qiegħed  fir-Renju Unit wara li attenda għall-inawgurazzjoni tal-logħob tal-Commonwealth. Huwa telaq minn Malta nhar l-Erbgħa fil-għodu.

Hekk kif l-ajruplan tal-Air Malta bl-Eċċellenza tiegħu fi triqtu lejn Birmingham inqata’ mill-art, l-Aġent President il-Professor Frank Bezzina kien fl-uffiċċju tal-President qiegħed jiffirma l-liġi bl-emendi tal-IVF. L-istess liġi li Dr Vella kien ilu ġranet sħaħ jirrifjuta li jiffirma.

L-istorja ma tieqafx hawn. Meta l-President, George Vella, irrifjuta li jiffirma huwa mar lil hinn mill-awtorità li tagħtih il-liġi u dan billi hu ma għandu l-ebda diskrezzjoni dwar kif jista’ jaġixxi: għandu jagħti l-kunsens tiegħu bla dewmien. Hekk jistabilixxi l-artiklu 72 tal-Kostituzzjoni tar-Repubblika ta’ Malta.

Anke l-Eċċellenza Tiegħu hu soġġett għal-liġi, f’dan il-każ il-Kostituzzjoni. Li jirrifjuta li jimxi ma dak li tgħid il-liġi, f’dan il-każ il-Kostituzzjoni, hu ksur serjissimu tar-responsabbiltajiet Kostituzzjonali Tiegħu. Fil-fehma tal-partit tiegħi dan hu suffiċjenti biex ikun ikkunsidrat li Dr George Vella jitneħħa mill-kariga ta’ President tar-Repubblika. L-Eċċellenza Tiegħu messu jkun ta’ eżempju dwar kif inbaxxu rasna għas-saltna tad-dritt. Kif nippretendu li ħaddiehor jaqdi dmiru jekk il-Kap tal-iStat jaġixxi b’dan il-mod u jagħti l-agħar eżempju possibli?

Għad baqa’ ċans biex il-Parlament jikkunsidra t-tneħħija ta’ Dr George Vella mill-ħatra u dan minħabba l-imġieba tiegħu li hi kemm inaċċettabbli kif ukoll illegali.

Imma l-Parlament għandu bżonn li jmur lil hinn minn ċensura qawwija ta’ Dr George Vella.  Għandu jikkunsidra fil-fond ir-rwol tal-President tar-Republika. Speċifikament għandu jkun ikkunsidrat li l-President ma għandux ikun sempliċi timbru imma li possibilment ikollu poter li jibgħat lura għand il-Parlament dawk il-liġijiet li fil-fehma tiegħu ma jkunux kompatibbli mal-kostituzzjoni.

Fis-sottomissjonijiet li l-partit li jiena immexxi kien għamel lill-Konvenzjoni Kostituzzjonali konna iffukajna fuq din il-materja, fost affarijiet oħra.  Fid-dokument li ippreżentajna lill-konvenzjoni, fis-sezzjoni intitolata : Il-President tar-Repubblika: ħatra u responsabbiltajiet, il-partit kien ippropona li l-President għandu jkollu id-dritt li jibgħat lura quddiem il-Parlament liġi biex din tkun ikkunsidrata mill-ġdid kemm-il darba fil-fehma tiegħu din il-liġi ma tkunx kompatibbli ma’ dak li tipprovdi l-Kostituzzjoni.  

Il-President, meta jidħol fil-ħatra, jiddikjara li hu/hi ser jiddefendi l-Kostituzzjoni. Imma minkejja li jassumi fuqu dan l-obbligu m’għandux għodda kostituzzjonali biex dan ikun jista’ jagħmlu.  Il-proposta tagħna ilha li ppreżentajniha kważi tlett snin. Biha ipproponejna l-għodda kostituzzjonali meħtieġa  li permezz tagħha l-Eċċellenza Tiegħunil-President ikun jista’ jaġixxi  b’mod responsabbli u bis-saħħa tal-liġi, f’ċirkustanzi serji fejn dan ikun meħtieġ. Konna pproponejna ukoll li jekk il-Parlament ma jibdilx jew jimmodifika il-posizzjoni tiegħu għas-sodisfazzjon tal-President dan ikollu l-possibilità li jibgħat il-liġi in kwistjoni quddiem il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali għal deċiżjoni finali. Hekk isiru l-affarijiet bis-serjetà.

B’dan il-mod l-uffiċċju tal-President ma jibqax sempliċi timbru kostrett li jgħid iva bilfors, inkella jopera barra mill-parametri tal-liġi. Dak li għamel il-President f’dawn il-ġranet hu gravi u setgħet inħolqot kriżi kostituzzjonali. Mhux l-ewwel darba li konna fix-xifer lijinqala’ incident simili. Xi snin ilu President ieħor kien indika (privatament) li ma kienx komdu li jiffirma il-liġi dwar l-Unjoni Ċivili (Att IX tal-2014).  Biex jikkalma s-sitwazzjoni u jevita kriżi Kostituzzjonali l-Gvern ta’ dakinnhar kien ippospona ftit il-vot finali fil-parliament sakemm laħaq inħatar President ġdid. Il-liġi dwar l-Unjoni Ċivili, fil-fatt kienet ġiet iffirmata mill-President nhar is-17 t’April 2014, tlettax-il jum wara li bdiet il-Presidenza ta’ Marie Louise Coleiro-Preca.

Jagħmel tajjeb il-Parliament jekk jikkunsidra din il-materja issa u jikkunsidraha sewwa. Hu essenzjali li l-President tar-Repubblika jkollu l-għodda kostituzzjonali biex ikun jista’ jaħdem b’mod responsabbli u skond il-liġi. Iktar ma dan isir malajr, aħjar.

ippubblikat fuq : Illum: 31 ta’ Lulju 2022

The Presidential rubberstamp

While you are reading through this article, His Excellency President George Vella is in the United Kingdom – after attending for the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth Games. He left these islands on Wednesday morning.

As soon as the Air Malta plane taking His Excellency to Birmingham was in the air, the Acting President Professor Frank Bezzina was at the President’s desk signing into law the IVF amendments. Those same amendments which Dr Vella refused to sign in the days before.

This is not the end of the story. By refusing to give his assent the President, George Vella, acted beyond his authority as in terms of law he had no discretion on the matter: he had to signify his assent without delay, as established by article 72 of the Constitution.

Even His Excellency is subject to the law, in this case the Constitution. His refusal to follow what is prescribed by the law is a serious breach of his Constitutional responsibilities, and, in the view of my party this gives rise to valid reasons to consider the impeachment of Dr George Vella from his Presidential duties. His Excellency should show us the way as to what it means to be subject to the rule of law. How do we expect others to carry out their duties if the Head of State acts in this way: the worst possible example?

There is still time for Parliament to consider impeachment proceedings against Dr George Vella and remove him from office in view of his unacceptable and illegal behaviour.

Parliament needs, however, to go beyond clearly censuring Dr George Vella. It is essential to consider in some depth the role of the President of the Republic. Specifically, it should consider whether the President should be just a rubberstamp or else whether he or she should have limited powers of review over Parliament’s legislative authority.

In submissions which the party that I lead presented to the Constitutional Convention we focused on this specific matter, among other issues. In a section of the document submitted to the Convention, entitled, The President of the Republic: appointment and responsibilities, my party proposed that the President should have the right to send legislation back to Parliament for its reconsideration, if, in his view such legislation runs counter to the provisions of the Constitution.

The President, on assuming office, declares that he/she will do all it takes to defend the Constitution. He/she is not however equipped with any (constitutional) tools with which to carry out his responsibilities. The Green proposal presented almost three years ago for the consideration of the Constitutional Convention identifies an essential tool with which His Excellency the President can act responsibly within the parameters of the law. We further proposed that should Parliament refuse to budge the President should refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a final decision.  This is the manner in which the Presidency should function. Much better than the present-day theatrics.

In this manner the President’s office would not be a mere rubberstamp, constrained to assent or else act outside the parameters of the law.  The President’s actions in the past days conveyed the worst possible message. It almost happened some years ago when another President had (privately) indicated that he would not assent to legislation relative to Civil Unions (Act IX of 2014). In order to avert a Constitutional crisis government had then slightly delayed the final vote in parliament, timing it with the swearing in of a new President. The Civil Unions Act was in fact signed on the 17 April 2014, just thirteen days into the Presidency of Marie Louise Coleiro-Preca.

Parliament would do well to consider the issue further. It is essential that the President of the Republic is adequately equipped with the necessary constitutional tools in order that he can carry out his duties in a responsible manner and within the parameters of the law. The sooner this is done, the better.

published in The Malta Independent on Sunday: 31 July 2022

L-uġiegħ ta’ ras tal-President tar-Repubblika

Il-President George Vella ma iffirmax il-liġi li taġġorna l-liġi tal-IVF għax għandu riżervi kbar dwarha.

Dan hu normali u mhiex xi ħaġa ġdida.

Il-Kostituzzjoni kif inhi illum, imma, ma tagħtihx il-fakolta li joqgħod jaħsibha għax tobbligah li jiffirma l-liġi bla dewmien. Hu għalhekk li l-bieraħ kont kritiku tal-President u tkellimt dwar proposta li għandu jitneħħa mill-kariga.

Il-partit li jiena immexxi diġa ippubblika soluzzjoni possibli għal din il-kriżi, li bla dubju, issa li nħoloq l-ewwel każ ser tirrepeti ruħha f’ċirkustanzi oħra li għad iridu jinqalgħu.

Fid-dokument li ippreżentajna lill-konvenzjoni kostituzzjonali konna għamilna proposta ċara li biex iħares u jiddefendi l-Kostituzzjoni kif stabilit fil-ġurament tal-ħatra, il-President għandu jkollu is-setgħa li, kemm-il darba jkun hemm dubju serju dwar il-kostituzzjonalità ta’ xi liġi approvata mill-Parlament, jibgħat lura quddiem l-istess Parlament il-liġi in kwistjoni biex din tkun ikkunsidrata mill-ġdid.

Din il-proposta ilna li għamilniha u għadha valida sal-lum.

Min irid jaqra id-dettalji dwarha jagħfas hawn u jmur fis-sezzjoni 12 intitolata: Il-President tar-Repubblika: ħatra u responsabbiltajiet. (paġna 15 sa 18).

Issa li ħareġ ir-riżultat finali tal-elezzjoni!

F’dawn il-mumenti li qed joħorġu l-aħħar riżultati qed issir magħrufa l-komposizzjoni tal-Parlament.

Il-Parlament issa hu magħmul minn 79 membru parlamentari.

Ir-riforma li saret setgħet tat riżultati aħjar. Minflok kompliet għaffġet.

Għal uħud, li daħlu fil-Parlament 12-il mara bil-mekkaniżmu tal-ġeneru hu mument ta’ ċelebrazzjoni.

Naħseb li mhux. Anzi hu mument ta’ negazzjoni tal-proċess demokratiku.

Mhux qed nikkritika l-fatt li l-Parlament aġxxa biex jindirizza l-iżbilanċ tal-ġeneru fil-komposizzjoni tal-Parlament wara l-elezzjoni. Il-kritika tiegħi u tal-partit li mmexxi hi iffukata fuq il-mod kif dan sar.

Il-Parlament spiċċa biex raqqa’ s-sistema elettorali b’mod li sistema elettorali mimlija difetti saret agħar milli kienet.

Il-Partit Laburista illum ghandu 38+ 6 = 44 siġġu parlamentari u l-Partit Nazzjonalista illum ghandu 27+ 2+ 6 = 35 siġġu parlamentari : b’kollox 79.

Il-Partit Laburista kiseb 162,707 voti fl-ewwel għadd: jiġifieri kull wieħed mill-44 siġġu parlamentari tal-PL qed jirrappreżenta 3698 vot. Il-Partit Nazzjonalista kiseb 123,233 vot fl-ewwel għadd: jiġifieri kull wieħed mill-35 siġġu parlamentari tal-PN qed jirrappreżenta 3521 vot.

L-ADPD fl-ewwel għadd kisbet 4747 voti. Bl-istess kejl li l-PN u l-PL qed japplikaw għalihom infushom aħna għandna dritt għal siġġu parlamentari aħna ukoll. Dik hi r-realtà tar-riforma li trodd il-proporzjonalità lill-PLPN u iċċaħħadha lill-bqija.

Kien hemm soluzzjonijiet oħra li kienu jirrispettaw il-volontà tal-elettorat. Sfortunatamanet dawn ġew skartati. Fid-dokument li ippreżentajna għall-konsiderazzjoni tal-kovenzjoni kostituzzjonali kif ukoll fis-sottomissjonijiet fil-proċess konsultattiv dwar kif għandu jkun indirizzat l-iżbilanċ tal-ġeneru fil-parlament repetutament għidna li hu possibli li jkollna parlament ta’ 65 membru, li jirrappreżenta proporzjonalment lill-elettorat li jagħżlu kif ukoll li jkun iktar rappreżentattiv tal-ġeneri. Imma dejjem sibna l-bibien magħluqin. Ħadd ma ried jiddiskuti.

Soluzzjoni ġusta tirrikjedi tibdil sostanzjali u mhux li tipprova temmen li solvejt problema billi toħloq oħra. Imma hemm wasalna illum!

Riforma tal-Parlament

Il-Prim Ministru ilu jinki lill-opinjoni pubblika dwar meta ser ikun xolt il-Parlament kif ukoll dwar meta ser tissejjaħ l-elezzjoni ġenerali.

Imma Robert Abela kien ikkwotat jgħid ukoll li sa Ġunju 2022 ikun għadda kollox!

Kif inhuma  l-affarijiet illum, hi responsabbiltà kostituzzjonali tal-Prim Ministru dwar meta jkun xolt il- Parlament kif ukoll dwar meta tissejjaħ elezzjoni ġenerali.  Dan jagħmlu billi jagħti parir dwar dan lill-President tar-Republika.  Ħafna drabi nassumu li dawn it-tip ta’ deċiżjonijiet jittieħdu fl-interess nazzjonali avolja hu ċar daqs il-kristall li hu l-interess tal-partit fil-Gvern li jiddetermina kollox: dejjem.  Miżura li ssaħħaħ il-posizzjoni tal-Gvern qabel u waqt l-elezzjoni: the power of incumbency.

Dan mhux sewwa u għandu jinbidel kif inbidlu bosta affarijiet oħra.

Il-partit li immexxi qajjem dan il-punt fis-sottomissjonijiet li għamilna quddiem il-Konvenzjoni Kostituzzjonali: konvenzjoni li, dejjem ġejja, imma qatt ma tasal!

Hu propost li t-terminu tal-Parlament ikun wieħed fiss u li l-Prim Ministru ma jkollu l-ebda diskrezzjoni dwar kif u meta dan ikun xolt.  Fil-prattika kemm l-Istati Uniti kif ukoll il-parti l-kbira tal-Ewropa kontinentali għandhom Parlament b’terminu fiss. Anke r-Renju Unit, meta kienet immexxija mill-koalizzjoni bejn il-partit Liberali u dak Konservattiv, ftit snin ilu, introduċiet leġislazzjoni għal Parlament b’terminu fiss.

F’dan il-kuntest tajjeb li jkun emfasizzat ukoll li t-terminu ta’ ħames snin għall-Parlament huwa ftit twil. Dan ma kienx dejjem hekk. Meta twaqqaf il-Parlament Malti għall-ewwel darba fl-1921, mitt sena ilu, il-ħajja tal-Parlament kienet ta’ tlett snin. Sal-lum il-ġurnata, l-Parlament Federali Awstraljan għadu jkun elett kull tlett snin. Il-Kamra tar-Rappresentanti tal-Istati Uniti min-naħa l-oħra tkun eletta kull sentejn.

X’uħud jistgħu jkunu tal-fehma li għall-Parlament, tul ta’ sentejn jew tlieta bejn elezzjoni u oħra huma ftit wisq. Għal min qiegħed fil-Gvern, ħames snin jistgħu jkun perjodu addattat. Imma għal min qiegħed fl-Opposizzjoni hu twil wisq! Tlett snin hu perjodu ferm iktar addattat.

Il-Parlament għandu ħtieġa ukoll ta’ membri li xogħolhom ikun biss dak ta’ membri tal-parlament u li ma jagħmlu xejn iktar. Hemm bżonn ukoll li n-numru ta’ membri tal-parlament jonqos għax in-numru li għandna illum hu kbir wisq.  Membru Parlamentari full-time jaqta’ għal kollox kull kuntatt ma xogħol u/jew professjoni u bħala riżultat ta’ hekk inaqqas sostanzjalment il-possibiltà ta’ kunflitt ta’ interess meta jkun f’posizzjoni li jieħu kwalunkwe deċiżjoni.

Id-daqs tal-lum tal-Parlament, jiġifieri dak ta’ 65 membru parlamentari, kien determinat bħala riżultat tal-emendi kostituzzjonali tal-1974.  Imma dan, illum il-ġurnata, sa mill-1987, mhux id-daqs definittiv għax miegħu jistgħu jiżdiedu iktar bħala riżultat tal-applikazzjoni tal-mekkaniżmu kostituzzjonali tal-proporzjonalità.   Jista’ jiżdiedu iktar ukoll, bi tnax-il membru ieħor riżultat tal-miżuri kostituzzjonali ġodda dwar il-bilanċ tal-ġeneru, jekk dawn ikunu applikati.

Il-Parlament li jmiss, għaldaqstant, jista’ jkunu kbir mhux ħażin jekk jintużaw kemm il-mekkaniżmu dwar il-proporzjonalità kif ukoll dak dwar il-bilanċ tal-ġeneru. Jista’ jkun daqs li jikber sa 77 membru u possibilment anke sa 81 membru. Dan hu enormi għall-pajjiżna.

Is-sistema elettorali, li ż-żewġ partiti fil-Parlament ilhom ibgħabsu għal żmien twil, tipprovdi għal riżultat proporjonali u b’element korrettiv favur il-bilanċ bejn il-ġeneri meta fil-Parlament ikunu eletti żewġ partiti politiċi biss. Meta jkun elett it-tielet partit dawn il-mekkaniżmi kostituzzjonali dwar il-proporzjonalità u l-bilanċ tal-ġeneru ma jistgħux jaħdmu. Hemm biss eċċezzjoni waħda. Din tkun fil-kaz ta’partit politiku li jikseb iktar minn 50 fil-mija tal-voti fl-ewwel għadd fuq livell nazzjonali. Dan ikollu dejjem il-jedd li jiggverna billi jkun allokat is-siġġijiet neċessarji għal dan l-iskop.  

Hemm numru ta’ soluzzjonijiet alternattivi li kieku ġew applikati kien ikun possibli li l-Parlament tagħna jkollu bilanċ aħjar bejn il-ġeneri u proporzjonalità mingħajr ma jikber fid-daqs.  Dawn is-soluzzjonijiet, imma, ġew skartati kompletament. Dan għax ir-riforma kellha dejjem l-iskop li toħloq l-inqas tibdil possibli. Tibdil kosmetiku fl-istil tal-Gattopardo: tibdil li jħalli kollox kif kien!

Dan hu l-Parlament tagħna. Jeħtieġ li jinbidel mill-qiegħ.   

ippubblikat fuq Illum : il-Ħadd 13 ta’ Frar 2022

Reforming Parliament

The Prime Minister has been teasing public opinion for some time as to when Parliament will be dissolved and when we will consequently be proceeding to the next general election.

Robert Abela has been quoted as stating that it will definitely be over by June 2022.

As things stand, at this point in time, it is within the Constitutional prerogative of the Prime Minister to determine when Parliament is dissolved and a general election held. This he does by advising the President of the Republic accordingly. It is generally assumed that such decisions are taken in the national interest even though it is amply clear that it is always in the interest of the political party in power. It reinforces the power of incumbency.

Is this right? Should it remain so?

My party has raised this matter in its submissions to the Constitutional Convention which Convention has been pending for a number of years!

It is being proposed that Parliament should be a fixed-term Parliament and that the Prime Minister should have no discretion whatsoever in dissolving Parliament.  In practice both the United States as well as most of continental Europe have fixed-term Parliaments. Even the United Kingdom, some years ago, led by a Liberal-Conservative coalition, introduced legislation for a Parliament having a fixed-term.

Within this context it would be also pertinent to emphasise that a five-year term is a little bit too long. This was not always so. When Malta’s Parliament was originally established in 1921, 100 years ago, it had a three-year life span. The Australian Federal Parliament in this day and age is still elected every three years. The United States House of Representatives on the other hand is elected every two years.

Some could argue that a two- or three-year life span for parliament would be too short. Five years may be right for those governing. It is however too long for those in Opposition! A three-year term could be the right balance.

Parliament also needs fulltime MPs and probably less of them. A fulltime member of parliament would cut off completely all of his/her links with profession and/or employment and as a result substantially reduce instances of conflict of interest when faced with decision taking.

Parliament’s present size of 65 members was determined as a result of the 1974 Constitutional amendments. Since 1987, it is however not a definite size, as it is increased as a result of the constitutional adjustment mechanism for proportionality. It will be increased by a further twelve members if the newly introduced constitutional gender balance requirements are applied.

The next Parliament could be quite large if both the proportionality and gender balance adjustment mechanisms are in use. It could inflate to a size between 77 and 81 members! This is enormous for a country our size.

The electoral system, which the two parties currently in parliament have been tinkering with for ages, provides for proportionality and gender balance only if just two parties are elected into Parliament. If a third party is elected, both the constitutional provisions for proportionality and gender balance will not be activated. There is just one exception and this is relative to the political party which obtains more than 50 per cent of the votes on a national level: in such an instant, irrespective of the number of political parties making it to Parliament the party having an absolute majority of votes is ensured of having the parliamentary seats required for governing.

There are a number of alternative solutions available which make it possible for our Parliament to be both gender-balanced and proportional without any increase in its size. These solutions have however been completely discarded as the “reform” brief was always to change as little as possible. Cosmetic change is the order of the day in Gattopardo style: change which leaves everything the same.

Such is the state of our parliament. It needs a complete overhaul, which is long overdue.  

published on The Malta Independent on Sunday: 13 February 2022

It-timbru tal-President tar-Repubblika

L-aħħar diskors tal-President, f’Għawdex fl-okkazjoni ta’ Jum ir-Repubblika, juri President inkwetat għax in-nies kienu qed jgħidulu biex ma jiffirmax il-liġi, approvata mill-Parlament, dwar l-użu responsabbli tal-cannabis.

Il-President George Vella, inkwetat, wieġeb, korrettement, li hu m’għandux dan il-poter li ma jiffirmax liġi approvata mill-Parlament. Għax hu l-Parlament li għandu l-poter demokratiku. Jekk il-President għax tniggżu l-kuxjenza ma jridx jiffirma, ikollu jwarrab, u jiffirma l-President li jilħaq ftit siegħat warajh.

Id-diffikultà, naħseb jien, hi li għal dawn l-aħħar snin qed ikollna President li jparla ħafna. President li qed jikkummenta fuq diversi materji ta’ kontroversja. Hu inevitabbli allura li jekk il-Presidenza tibqa’ tgħaddi l-kummenti ser tibqa’ l-pressjoni fuqha biex taġixxi mod u mhux mod ieħor.

Tajjeb li il-President tar-Repubblika jkun iktar minn timbru.

Fil-fatt fil-proċess konsultattiv dwar ir-riforma Kostituzzjonali, Alternattiva Demokratika, illum ADPD, ippreżentat proposti prattiċi dwar kif u f’liema ċirkustanzi l-President jista’ ma jiffirmax liġi u jibgħatha lura għand il-Parlament biex dan jikkunsidrha mill-ġdid.

Għax il-President tar-Repubblika m’għandux ikun timbru għal dak li jagħmel jew irid jagħmel il-Gvern.

Id-dokument li nirreferi għalih dwar ir-riforma kostituzzjonali tista’ tarawh hawn.

A fixed-term Parliament

At this point in time, within the party we are discussing our electoral Manifesto for the forthcoming general election. When will it be held: shortly or much later? At the time of writing no official announcement has been made. Maybe by the time this article is printed matters would be clear.

When presenting proposals for the consideration of the ever-pending Constitutional Convention, we had as a party considered the matter in some detail: should the Prime Minister have the discretion to advise on the dissolution of Parliament?  This was one of the “rights” of Kings and Queens which have been inherited by Heads of Government as a result of democratisation. Since independence it has been the Prime Minister’s right in Malta to advise that Parliament be dissolved and that an election be called.

Over two years have now elapsed since we proposed to the Constitutional Convention that Parliament should have a fixed term and that the election date should be fixed.

Such a provision is normally associated with the American experience on the first Tuesday of the month of November: every alternate year electing the House of Representatives, every four years for electing the President and for electing a third of the Senate every two years.

In the United Kingdom the Liberal-Conservative coalition had in 2011 introduced a fixed-term Parliament Act as a result of which, for the first time ever, the Prime Minister’s role in determining the date of dissolution of Parliament and the subsequent holding of a general election were severely curtailed.

Nick Clegg, then Liberal leader and Deputy Prime Minister had, in piloting the relevant act in Parliament, described such a move stripping Prime Ministers of the power to pick election dates to maximise party advantage as a profound reform. He further emphasised that such a reform was essential to restore faith in politics.

The introduction of a constitutional provision for a fixed-term Parliament would entail removing political self-interest from election timing.

Of course, all Prime Ministers, with tears in their eyes, plead national interest whenever they make use of this discretion.

It would be interesting if we could have an explanation as to what “national interest justification” exists for having a snap-election in Malta at this point in time. Robert Abela’s justification could be as follows.

The first reason to justify a snap election is that come January 2022 a criminal jury relative to the failed HSBC hold-up is scheduled. Possible revelations could spot-light the alleged role of senior Labour Party politicians in the planning of this failed hold-up. Probably Robert Abela thinks that having clear information as to who was involved in planning the HSBC hold-up is not in our interest. It is definitely not in the interest of the Labour Party as it could unmask the Labour Party for what it really is: an eye-opener to some!

The second reason to justify a snap election is the turbulent energy market which could play havoc with the costs to generate electricity locally. Given that we import gas through a contract which is to expire shortly, the price of gas used at Delimara to generate electricity will probably sky-rocket. Alternatively, we use the interconnector to tap energy generated on the mainland. The use of the interconnector was very recently curtailed due to the substantial increase in the price of the energy available!  A substantial increase would impact government finances negatively and Robert Abela would prefer not to have this fact in the public domain during an electoral campaign.

The third reason would be the impacts of grey-listing which are bound to increase with time. The longer it takes to take action as per the agreed road-map with the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) the more the impacts. Labour cannot divorce itself from this. They think that having an election out of the way would at least shield Labour from more electoral impacts of grey-listing.

Having a snap election could potentially shield the Labour Party from these and other impacts which could have a substantial political fallout. The snap election will not address these problems, it will just postpone them into the future.

A fixed-term Parliament would do away with all this. Instead of trying to avoid problems it is better to address them head-on.

published in The Malta Independent on Sunday : 24 October 2021

Drittijiet Ambjentali bir-riforma kostituzzjonali

Il-Konvenzjoni Kostituzzjonali, meta tiġi, tkun opportunità unika biex ikunu ntrodotti drittijiet ambjentali fil-Kostituzzjoni. Dan jista’ u għandu jseħħ billi dawn id-drittijiet jinkitbu b’mod ċar u li ma jħallux lok għal miżinterpretazzjoni f’riforma li ilna nistennew żmien kbir.

Id-drittijiet ambjentali, għandhom ikunu ċari daqs id-drittijiet dwar il-propjetà. Għax il-Kostituzzjoni, b’mod pervers, filwaqt li tipproteġi drittijiet dwar il-propjetà, illum ma toffri l-ebda protezzjoni għal drittijiet ambjentali bħad-dritt għal arja nadifa inkella għal aċċess għal ilma nadif. L-anqas ma tipproteġi l-bijodiversità jew il-pajsaġġ jew kwalunkwe dritt ambjentali ieħor bħall-ħarsien tar-riżorsi naturali. Id-drittijiet tal-individwi huma b’xi mod protetti imma d-drittijiet tal-komunità l-anqas biss jissemmew.

Meta wieħed iqis li d-drittijiet tal-ġenerazzjonijiet preżenti huma kemm kemm protetti, xejn ma hemm biex niskantaw jekk il-liġi bażika tagħna tinjora lill-ġenerazzjonijiet futuri għal kollox.

Waqt li dan kollu kien għaddej, Malta, fuq livell internazzjonali nsistiet dwar il-ħarsien ta’ qiegħ il-baħar (1967), dwar il-klima (1988) u dwar il-ġenerazzjonijiet futuri (1992). Imma minkejja dawn l-isforzi fuq livell internazzjonali, ma sar l-ebda sforz lokali biex dak li nippriedkaw barra minn xtutna nipprattikawh f’artna.  

Il-Kostituzzjoni ta’ Malta, fil-Kapitlu 2 tagħha, għanda sett ta’ linji gwida biex dawn ikunu ta’ għajnuna lill-Gvern billi b’mod ġenerali jindikaw it-triq li jeħtieġ li jimxi fuqha.  Wieħed minn dawn il-prinċipji gwida huwa dwar il-ħarsien ambjentali. Dan tfassal oriġinalment fl-1964 u ġie emendat riċentement.  

Wara din il-lista ta’ linji gwida, fl-aħħar tagħhom, il-Kostituzzjoni tgħidilna li ma tistax tmur il-Qorti biex tinfurzhom!

Dan il-kapitlu tal-Kostituzzjoni huwa mfassal fuq dak li hemm fil-Kostituzzjoni tal-Irlanda u tal-Indja. Kif jispjega Tonio Borg fil-kummentarju tiegħu dwar il-kostituzzjoni ta’ Malta, l-Qorti Suprema Indjana minkejja kollox, imma, interpretat il-linji gwida fil-Kostituzzjoni Indjana bħala l-kuxjenza tal-kostituzzjoni : linja gwida tabilħaqq.  Għax x’jiswa’ li toqgħod tipprietka u tħambaq dwar il-prinċipji bażiċi u l-linji gwida jekk imbagħad iżżomhom milli jkunu infurzati?

Sfortunatament, din l-istess attitudni kienet addottata meta tfasslet leġislazzjoni dwar l-ippjanar għall-użu tal-art u dwar l-ambjent. Anke hawn wara ħafna dikjarazzjonijiet ta’ prinċipji nsibu li dwar dawn ukoll ma tistax tmur il-Qorti biex tinfurzhom.

Fis-sottomissjonijiet tagħha lill Konvenzjoni Kostituzzjonali, Alternattiva Demokratika,  ipproponiet li dan il-kapitlu fil-kostituzzjoni għandu jkun revedut b’mod li jkun assigurat li l-Gvern dejjem jimxi mal-linji gwida kostituzzjonali.   

F’pajjiżi oħra, s-soċjetà ċivili, meta meħtieġ, tieħu azzjoni legali kontra l-Gvern biex tassigura li dan jerfa’ r-responsabbiltajiet ambjentali tiegħu f’kull ħin.

Għandi f’moħħi żewġ eżempji partikolari.

L-ewwel wieħed hu dwar azzjoni legali fir-Renju Unit mill-għaqda ambjentali  Client Earth dwar il-mod kajman li bih il-Gvern Ingliż mexa fil-konfront ta’ strateġija nazzjonali dwar il-kwalità tal-arja. Il-materja spiċċat quddiem il-Qorti Suprema li f’deċiżjoni ta’ struzzjonijiet lill-Gvern dwar iż-żmien sa meta għandha tkun lesta din l-istrateġija.   

It-tieni eżempju qiegħed l-Olanda u jikkonċerna t-tibdil fil-klima u l-grupp ambjentali  Urgenda li mar il-Qorti biex iġiegħel lil Gvern jistabilixxi miri raġjonevoli dwar emissjonijiet li għandhom impatt fuq il-bidla fil-klima.

F’dawn l-eżempji, u probabbilment f’bosta oħrajn, l-azzjoni tal-Gvern kienet ferm inferjuri għall-aspettattivi tas-soċjetà ċivili. Ikun tajjeb li l-kostituzzjoni tipprovdina bl-għodda biex kull meta l-Gvern jonqos milli jimxi mal-miri kostituzzjonali ikun possibli li nippruvaw inġibuh f’sensieh.

Sal-lum niddependu mill-Kummissjoni Ewropeja bit-tama li meta jkun meħtieġ din tieħu passi. Nistqarr li f’materji ambjentali, bosta drabi tiddisappuntana u ma tagħmilx dak li nistennew minn għandha.

Il-konvenzjoni Kostituzzjonali sal-lum, tista’ tkun l-unika forum fejn dan id-difett kostituzzjonali jkun possibli li nikkoreġuh. Għax hu l-waqt li d-drittijiet ambjentali jsiru parti integrali mill-kostituzzjoni.

Ippubblikat fuq Illum: il-Ħadd 6 ta’ Settembru 2020

Green rights through Constitutional reform

The forthcoming Constitutional Convention, whenever it happens, is an opportunity to entrench green rights in the Constitution. This can be carried out through spelling out such rights unequivocally during the long overdue constitution reform process.

Environmental rights should be spelled out just as clearly as property rights. Our Constitution perversely protects property rights but then does not protect our right to clean air or the access to clean water. Nor does it protect our biodiversity or our landscape or any other environmental right. Individual rights are somehow protected but then the rights of the community are not even given a mention.

When one considers that the rights of the present generations are very poorly protected no one should be surprised that future generations are completely ignored in our basic law.

While this has been going on, Malta has on an international level been insisting on protecting the seabed (1967), the climate (1988) and future generations (1992). Notwithstanding the efforts made on an international level, however, there was no corresponding local effort to put in practice what we preached in international fora.

Malta’s Constitution contains a set of guiding principles in its Chapter 2 which are intended to guide government in its workings. One of these guiding principles relates to environmental protection. Originally enacted in 1964 it was amended recently.

Yet there is a catch. Towards the end of this list of guiding principles our Constitution announces that these principles cannot be enforced in a Court of Law.

This Chapter of our Constitution is modelled on similar provisions in the Irish and the Indian Constitutions. As explained in Tonio Borg’s A Commentary on the Constitution of Malta, however, the Indian Supreme Court has over the years interpreted similar constitutional provisions as the conscience of the Constitution, a real guiding light. It does not make sense to proclaim basic and guiding principles, declare that they should guide the state but then stop short of having them enforceable in a Court of Law.    

Unfortunately, the same attitude was adopted when drafting land use planning and environmental legislation. This legislation contains similar provisions: the announcement of basic guiding principles which are not enforceable in a Court of Law.

In its submissions to the Constitutional Convention, Alternattiva Demokratika-The Green Party has proposed revisiting this Chapter of the Constitution in order that it would be possible to ensure that government follows the guiding principles at all times instead of selectively.  

In other countries it is possible for civil society to take legal action to ensure that government carries out its environmental responsibilities adequately and at all times.

Two particular examples come to mind.

The first is legal action in the United Kingdom by environmental NGO Client Earth relative to the UK government’s lack of action on the formulation of an air quality masterplan. The matter ended up in a Supreme Court decision which instructed the UK government to act and established the parameters for such action including the relative timeframe.  

The second example comes from Holland and concerns climate change and the environmental action group Urgenda Foundation which went to Court to force government’s hand on the establishment of reasonable climate change emission targets.

In both the above examples, and probably in many others, government action was far below the expectations of civil society. It is right that the Constitution should provide us with the necessary tools such that whenever government fails to live up to the Constitutional benchmarks, (be these environmental or any other) then, civil society may call government to order.

To date we depend on the EU Commission as a fallback position, but the EU Commission, unfortunately, does not always live up to what we expect of it. It has let us down many times. The Constitutional Convention is the only forum possible, so far, through which this constitutional deficiency can be corrected. It is about time that our green rights are entrenched in the Constitution.

published in The Malta Independent on Sunday: 6 September 2020