Malta and the defense policy of the European Union

The issue of the development of an adequate defense policy has been on the EU agenda for some time. This is not only the inevitable result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it also necessarily follows from the Trump threats relative to NATO not only during his Presidential term but also in the current US electoral campaign.

This week, EU Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, emphasized that the EU would need to spend more of its funds on defense after the latest Trump threats. Earlier, Manfred Weber, the Bavarian leader of the European People’s Party (EPP), had spoken at length on the need for Europe to increase its defense spending and on the EPP’s proposal that the EU should invest in nuclear deterrence. Do we need this? France already has 300 nuclear warheads!

The defense industry, including that within the European Union itself, is undoubtedly lobbying intensively. An EU defense budget running into several billion euros would definitely be in their interest! In 2023 the EU’s military spending reached a record €230 billion.

Some years back Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) reported that the decision-making process for the EU Preparatory Action on Defense Research was heavily dominated by corporate interests. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) is a research and campaign group working to expose and challenge the privileged access and influence enjoyed by corporations and their lobby groups in EU policy making.

A leaked draft of the EPP EU Parliamentary elections electoral manifesto indicates the proposal for the creation of a standalone defense portfolio in the next EU Commission.

Two EU Member states, Sweden and Finland, faced with the realty of Russian aggression against its neighbor Ukraine have abandoned their neutrality and sought NATO membership. Finland has already joined. When Sweden eventually joins NATO, 24 EU member states out of 28 will be NATO members, the exceptions being Malta, Austria, Ireland and Cyprus. Cyprus has in the past sought NATO membership but its application has been blocked by Türkiye.

In this context what is the significance of Malta’s neutrality? This is an essential debate, long overdue,  which should not be avoided, especially in view of the prevalent discourse in the EU at this point in time and particularly in view of developments on EU defense policy which are now inevitable.

Malta’s foreign policy has always been dependent on third countries guaranteeing its security. In the past it was an agreement with four countries, namely Italy, France, Libya and Algeria, which after the 1979 closure of the military base in Malta served this purpose. Nowadays this vacuum is filled by the provisions of the EU treaties as a result of which solidarity between EU member states signifies in practice that, in time of need, all the 28 states are there to help out each other. Even in matters of defense.

However, we know through experience that this does not necessarily work out. At the end of the day states do not have friends but interests which limit or enhance their actions or policy options. Within the European Union this is no different. The difficulties faced in addressing migration issues is a case in point: solidarity between EU member states has proven to be difficult to attain in practice notwithstanding the provisions of the EU treaties.

Security and defense issues are undoubtedly continuously on the diplomatic agenda. What results does not necessarily spill over in the public political debate.

Occasionally it is different: this happened in the recent past through discussions on the possibilities for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Malta and the United States of America around four years ago.

Particularly since the closure of the British military base, multilateral engagement has always been Malta’s preferred defense policy option.  It is hence in Malta’s interests that the European Union is in a position to adequately take care of its own defense. However, we need to participate actively in the EU defense debate, even if, as a direct consequence it may be necessary to re-visit and tweak our neutrality.

Protecting our interests signifies an active participation in the EU defense debate and applying the breaks, when necessary, to a rising militarism within the EU. At the end of the day, it is in our interest to speak up clearly.

published in the Malta Independent on Sunday : 18 February 2024

Il-Kabinett Nazzjonalista li jmiss

Hi ħasra għall-PN innifsu u għall-pajjiż li għal raġunijiet tattiċi l-aħjar fost il-kandidati għat-tmexxija tal-PN kienu sfurzati biex jirtiraw mit-tellieqa.

Bla dubju kemm il-pajjiż kif ukoll il-PN innifsu ser ikun  telliefa bħala riżultat tal-fatt li Therese Commodini Cachia, Roberta Metsola u Mark Anthony Sammut ma komplewx bil-kandidatura taghhom. Il-kandidatura tat-tlieta li huma kienet tibgħat messaġġi posittivi mhux biss għall-PN innifsu imma anke għall-pajjiż.

Il-kandidati li baqa’, Adrian Delia u Bernard Grech, għal raġunijiet differenti, iwasslu messaġġ negattiv.

Kif intqal mit-Times illum, l-għażla hi waħda bejn żewġ possibilitajiet negattivi: Hobson’s choice qalet is-Sunday Times.

Il-Partit Nazzjonalista ilu snin sejjer lura u jidher li ma jridx jitgħallem.

It-tesserati tal-PN għandhom id-dritt li jagħżlu li min iridu. Imma fl-aħħar minn l-aħħar tajjeb li jżommu quddiem għajnejhom li huma l-votanti li jagħmlu l-għażla finali.

It-triq li ilu li qabad il-PN hi għan-niżla, irrispettivament minn min ser jintagħżel. Hi triq li dejjem qed tagħmilha iktar ċara li l-membri tal-Kabinett Nazzjonalista li jmiss probabbilment għadhom l-anqas twieldu.

Leo Brincat: loyalties and lip service

When Leo Brincat gave evidence before the EU Parliamentary Committee on Budgetary Control last week he was, as anticipated, quizzed on his position regarding the Panama Papers.

Leo Brincat made himself crystal clear by stating that he would have submitted his resignation – or else suspended himself from office until such time as matters would have been clarified – had he been himself involved.

He volunteered the information that there had been a point at which he had considered resigning from Ministerial office due to the manner in which the Panama Papers scandal was handled in Malta. He added that, eventually, however, his considerations did not materialise and he did not resign as he had no desire to be a “hero for a day and end up in the (political) wilderness” thereafter.

Then came the fundamental issue: what about his vote against the motion of No Confidence in Minister Konrad Mizzi which was discussed by Malta’s House of Representatives? He emphasised that he could not vote in favour of the No Confidence motion as he was bound by the party’s Parliamentary Whip! It was a basic standard of local politics, based on the Westminister model, he emphasised.

At this point Leo Brincat made it clear to the EU Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee that he had made a very important and fundamental choice: he preferred loyalty to the party whip to loyalty to his principles: those same principles which he has been harping on for ages. When push came to shove, solidarity with Konrad Mizzi took priority over good governance. This is what irked a substantial number of MEPs and prompted them not to recommend the  approval of Leo Brincat as a member of the European Court of Auditors. Leo’s declaration means only one thing: that his statements on good governance are only lip service to which there is no real commitment.

From this point onwards, the issue became one of principle, stated Slovenian Green MEP Igor Šoltes, Vice Chairman of the EU Parliamentary Committee on Budgetary Control and rapporteur on the European Court of Auditors, when interviewed by the local media. How is it possible to expect appointment to the European Court of Auditors and simultaneously give a nod of approval to Konrad Mizzi? Leo’s reluctance to distance himself from Konrad’s misbehaviour was his undoing.

Leo Brincat was considered as being technically qualified for the post of member of the European Court of Auditors but his public behaviour relative to the Panama Papers left much to be desired: it rendered him ethically unqualified.

Most of the information on Malta and the Panama Papers scandal is freely available online. In this day and age, MEPs and their staff, like anyone else, can easily look up all the information they need in an instant. They do not need any prodding by David Casa, Roberta Metsola, Therese Commodini Cachia or anyone else!

The facts are damning enough. Leo Brincat, unfortunately, came across as an ambivalent person who speaks in favour of good governance yet through his vote simultaneously gives support to its negation. Konrad Mizzi’s behaviour,, sanctioned in parliament by the vote of Leo Brincat and his colleagues on the government benches, signifies that the Parliamentary Labour Party in Malta does not care about good governance. Leo Brincat’s failure is quite representative of the Labour Parliamentary group’s behaviour in Malta, as they have all contributed to this mess – the effects of which are yet to come.

In fairness, I must also point out that the press had, at a point in time picked up information about a rowdy Labour Party Parliamentary Group meeting during which Leo Brincat and a number of other MPs (including a number of Ministers ) had argued for Konrad Mizzi’s resignation or removal. It is indeed unfortunate that Joseph Muscat did not feel sufficiently pressured to remove Konrad Mizzi from Cabinet, as that meeting was only followed up with cosmetic changes in Konrad Mizzi’s Cabinet responsibilities.

It is useless to try and shift the blame onto Joseph Muscat and his cronies. While Joseph Muscat is ultimately responsible, this does not exonerate Leo Brincat and each individual member of the Labour Party Parliamentary group; each one of them too must shoulder responsibilities for  failure to act in removing Konrad Mizzi from public office.

At the end of the day there is just one lesson: loyalty to your conscience is not up for bartering.