Brexit u l-artiklu 50 tat-trattat ta’ Liżbona

house-of-commons

 

Fil-Qrati Ingliżi infetaħ l-ewwel kaz dwar ir-referendum Ingliż. Il-Guardian illum tirrapporta li saret l-ewwel talba lill-Qrati Ingliżi li issostni illi l-Prim Ministru Ingliż m’għandux id-dritt li jibda l-proċess tal-ħruġ tar-Renju Unit mill-Unjoni Ewropeja mingħajr ma l-ewwel ikollu l-approvazzjoni tal-Parlament.

Uħud qed jinterpretaw dan bħala li l-Parlament Ingliż jista’ jkollu l-poter li jmur kontra x-xewqat ta-elettorat kif espress fir-riżultat tar-referendum tat-23 ta’ Ġunju. Ċertament li dan mhux il-każ. Għax għalkemm fis-sistema legali Ingliża l-Parlament hu suprem din is-supremazija legali mhux ser tintuża kontra r-rieda popolari espressa b’mod daqstant ċar mill-elettorat.

X’ser jiġri issa hu diffiċli biex tgħid. Imma hu possibli li jekk il-Qrati Ingliżi jaċċettaw it-talba li qed issirilhom u jiddeċiedu li qabel ma issir id-dikjarazzjoni skond l-artiklu 50 tat-Trattat ta’ Liżbona jkun hemm il-kunsens tal-Parlament, il-Gvern ewroxekkitiku tar-Renju Unit (immexxi minn Theresa May jew Andrea Leadsom) ikun soġġett għal Parlament li fil-maġġoranza tiegħu hu magħmul minn Membri Parlamentari li m’humiex favur il-ħruġ tar-Renju Unit mill-Unjoni Ewropeja.

Dan jista’ jwassal għal diversi kundizzjonijiet li possibilment ikun jista’ jimponi l-Parlament. Fosthom li kull ftehim dwar il-ħruġ tar-Renju Unit mill-Unjoni Ewropeja jkun soġġett għall-approvazzjoni tal-istess Parlament! Dan bla dubju joħloq problemi kbar għall-applikazzjoni tal-artiklu 50 tat-trattat ta’ Liżbona. Ikun ifisser ukoll li neċessarjament ikun meħtieg perjodu ta’ negozjati qabel ma jkun applikat l-artiklu 50. Għax minkejja li l-Kummissjoni Ewropeja ma tridx tinnegozja dwar dan, it-trattat ta’ Liżbona ma jagħmilx limitazzjoni ta’ din ix-xorta.

Imma bla dubju jekk dan iseħħ ikun qed jagħti l-poter kompletament f’idejn il-Parlament u jassoġġetta lill-Gvern tal-ġurnata għall-iskrutinju strett tal-istess Parlament. Użat b’mod responsabbli, dan il-poter bla dubju jista’ jwassal għal żviluppi interessanti.

Brexit : issa x’imiss?

downing-street

L-istennija dwar dak li ser jiġri fir-Renju Unit wara r-riżultat tar-referendum qed tikber.

Bla dubju jista’ jkun hemm impatt ekonomiku qawwi, inkluż telf ta’ impiegi. Fil-qasam finanzjarju b’mod partikolari hu stmat li jistgħu jintilfu sa’ 70,000 impieg  matul it-tnax-il xahar li gejjin, unikament minħabba r-riżultat tar-referendum.

X’ser jiġri ser ikun jiddependi ħafna minn min jirbaħ l-elezzjoni għat-tmexxija tal-Partit Konservattiv Ingliż. Michael Gove u Theresa May diġa iddikjaraw illi jekk jirbħu huma għandhom ta’ l-inqas sal-aħħar tas-sena biex jibdew il-process tat-tluq mill-Unjoni Ewropeja. Dan ifisser li kemm Gove kif ukoll May iridu jimxu b’mod kawt. Min-naħa l-oħra, kandidata oħra għat-tmexxija konservattiva, Andrea Leadsom iddikjarat illi jekk eletta hi tattiva mill-ewwel il-proċeduri stabiliti fl-artiklu 50 tat-Trattat ta’ Liżbona.

Dewmien ma jfissirx biss effetti negattivi. Imma jfisser ukoll il-possibilità li dawk li qed jirreżistu li jkun hemm negozjati qabel mar-Renju Unit idabbar rasu jerġgħu jaħsbuha. In-negozjati mmedjati jistgħu jkunu kruċjali. Għax kif ġustament ikkummenta l-ex-Prim Ministru Laburista Ingliz Tony  Blair il-bieraħ, hu possibli li l-opinjoni pubblika terġa’ taħsibha hekk kif ikunu magħrufa l-kundizzjonijiet tat-tluq.

Hi posizzjoni fluwida ħafna, li, sakemm ma jiġrix xi ħaġa straordinarja, ser tibqa’ hekk sakemm jinħatar Prim Ministru ġdid tar-Renju Unit.

Awaiting Brexit?

EU-UK

Will the United Kingdom exit the European Union? There is the distinct possibility that the answer to that question will depend on how long it takes for a decision to be taken.

The main political parties in the United Kingdom are currently dealing with the fallout of the Brexit referendum. The Conservatives are in the process of electing a new leader to replace David Cameron, who has resigned, and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is licking the wounds inflicted by the Vote of No Confidence passed by Labour’s Parliamentary Group.

In the meantime, the EU is awaiting the triggering of the exit procedures as established by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. David Cameron has conveniently passed on the baton to his successor, so far undetermined. Two of the contenders for this position, Theresa May and Michael Gove, on the other hand, have said that if elected, Article 50 will definitely not be triggered before the end of the year.

Given that applying Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty signifies the potential cancellation of a large part of EU legislation currently applicable in the UK, it stands to reason that it is only through an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament that the authority to trigger the application of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty can be attained.

A basic bone of contention is whether the UK will trigger the provisions of Article 50 before or after it enters discussions with the EU. Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker is adamant that no discussions should take place before the UK triggers Article 50. Yet this does not make sense for the UK, because once Article 50 has been triggered, there is no going back. It makes much more sense, and is also in line with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, for the EU and the UK to discuss the terms of an exit in accordance with their respective political priorities.

The issues are clear enough: whether access to the European single market should be tied to the four freedoms, that is freedom of movement of capital, goods, people and services.

Implementing Brexit should mean that the UK’s position is crystal clear: it is against the free movement of people. In fact, this is what the “taking back control” phrase of the ‘leave’ campaign means. Translated into an agreement regulating the UK’s exit from the EU, it should mean that there is no possibility of the EU conceding access to the single market. But will the UK’s political position be that clear and unequivocal? Many in the leave campaign want to have their cake and eat it. They want the benefits of membership (access to the single market) without shouldering the burdens (free movement of people). This is clearly not possible and can be made amply clear in formal or informal discussions prior to triggering Article 50.

The (new) UK government will have some serious homework to do before it sits down at the negotiating table. If it sticks to the Brexit conclusions, the terms of the agreement regulating the UK’s exit from the EU should not take long to identify. It will, however, not be that simple and ultimately it will depend on the composition of the new UK government.

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Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty

  1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
  2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
  3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

published in The Malta Independent on Sunday : July 3, 2016